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COMMENT
HOW THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT DETER-
MINES ULTIMATE LIABILITY FOR A CLAIM AGAINST
A GENERAL PARTNERSHIP AND PROVIDES FOR THE
SETTLING OF ACCOUNTS BETWEEN PARTNERS
I. INTRODUCTION
When a person does business with one partner in a partner-
ship and suffers harm that leads to a cause of action, courts are
faced with three issues that often get intertwined and confused. A
particular dispute may involve either one, two or all three of these
issues. This comment attempts to identify and sort out these
issues and show examples of how to resolve these types of cases.
A threshold issue is from which of the partners may the third
party recover. This issue presents relatively few problems.
Courts historically have protected the interests of third parties in
their dealings with partnerships. This issue is discussed in Sec-
tion II.
Another issue that a court might have to deal with is deter-
mining the responsible party. The ultimate responsibility might
belong to the acting partner or the partnership itself, depending
on the circumstances of the particular act that led to the liability.
Although the distinction is not a bright line, this comment argues
that the almost complete adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act
(hereinafter "the Act")' has led courts to hold the acting partner
ultimately liable for acts only when they reach the level of
recklessnes. Consequently, other acts leading to liability should
1. The UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT was drafted in 1914 and has since been
adopted in most jurisdictions. See Appendix I for a complete list of jurisdictions
that have adopted the AcT and when the most recent version went into effect.
Although states sometimes change uniform laws, the part of the AcT discussed in
this comment remains unchanged in all jurisdictions that have adopted it. Some
state have changed the wording and these states are noted in Appendix I. Also,
Appendix II is a collection of pertinent provisions of the AT used in this
Comment.
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be born by the partnership. This argument is advanced in Section
III.
Often, a court must face a third issue, adjusting accounts
between the partners. This may occur in an accounting action
between partners,2 an action by the third party against all the
partners,3 or an action by another partner after the liability has
already been satisfied.4 This issue is a function of how ultimate
liabililty and plaintiff's choice of defendant combine. Disputes
may be classified in six different categories, which are discussed in
Section IV. By regarding the partnership as an entity6 , and using
the tools of indemnification 7 and contribution8 provided by the
Act, courts can shift the liability to the responsible party. A sys-
tematic approach will allow the court to untangle the issues and
properly dispose of these types of cases.9
II. PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF THOSE DEALING WITH
THE PARTNERSHIP
The threshold issue is from which of the partners may the
third party recover. When an act or an omission by a partner
gives rise to a third party claim, the courts seek to protect the
interest of the third party who deals with a partnership by holding
all partners liable to the third party.10 The courts will not allow
2. See Kiffer v. Bienstock, 218 N.Y.S. 526 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1926).
3. See Marcus v. Green, 300 N.E.2d 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
4. See North Rivers Ins. Co. v. Spain Oil Corp., 515 N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1987).
5. Also, there is no assurance under joinder rules that one partner will be
able to join any of the others in the suit; however the test is very flexible. JACK H.
FRIENDENTHAL ET.AL., CwIL PROCEDURE § 6.4, at 329-34 (1985); see, e.g., Flynn v.
Reaves, 218 S.E.2d 661 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
6. The partnership can be viewed either as an entity within itself, or as an
aggregate of partners. See discussion infra section III.A.
7. Indemnification is basically reimbursing someone for an expense they
have paid that should belong to someone else. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §
18(b) (1914). See discussion infra section III.B.
8. Contribution is basically paying someone back for the excess they have
already paid. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(a) (1914). See discussion infra
section III.B.
9. Without proper analysis the variables in these cases can cause
inconsistent results. It is the purpose of this Comment to exemplify a process for
settling these issues in accord with the ACT.
10. See FDIC v. Braemoor Assocs., 686 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 927 (1983). Many states have now passed enabling statutes that allow
firms to organize as Limited Liability Partnerships, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-
334 [Vol. 17:333
2
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss2/4
1995] PARTNERSHIP INDEMNIFICATION & CONTRIBUTION
the other partners or joint venturers11 to escape liability, even
when the acting partner acts illegally. 12 An early English deci-
sion, Hamlyn v. Houston,'3 illustrates this point well. In Hamlyn,
one partner of the defendant-partnership bribed the clerk of a
competitor into providing him with information that would help
him procure contracts for the partnership. 14 When the competi-
tor- plaintiff sued for damage to his business, the other partner
claimed that since the act was illegal, the firm was not liable
because it was outside the scope of the acting partner's author-
ity.15 Using general agency principles, the court held that even if
the act was illegal, if it was within the general scope of authority,
the principal may be liable. 16 The court reasoned "the principal is
the person who has selected the agent, and must therefore be
taken to have had better means of knowing what sort of a person
he was than those with whom the agent deals on behalf of his
principal . .. ."7
84.2 (1993), or Limited Liability Companies, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to
57C-10-03 (1993), to escape this imputed liability. Partnerships still remain a
viable business entity. In 1982 approximately 1,500,000 partnerships submitted
tax information to the IRS. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RmsTEiN, BROMBERG
& RmsTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP 1:26 (1988). There is also the possibility that a
business formed according to some statutory guidelines will fail to meet the
requirements and therefore will be handled in accordance with general
partnership principles. See, e.g., Holzman v. De Escamilla, 195 P.2d 833 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1948). In Holzman, two partners tried to establish a limited
partnership, but since the checks issued by the business required the signature
of one of the limited partners, the statutory protection was not available. Id.
11. Many of these cases arise in joint venture situations. See, e.g., Woodner
Co. v. Laufer, 531 A.2d 280 (D.C. 1987). In Woodner, the court remanded to
determine whether the enterprise was a joint venture or not. Id. at 286. If it was
determined to be a joint venture, the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT would be
applied. Id. For purposes of simplicity, only the term partner(s) and
partnership(s) will be used in this comment. The reader is asked to remember
that the terms joint venturer(s) and joint venture(s) could be used
interchangeably and produce the same legal consequences.
12. See Hamlyn v. Houston, 1 IKB. 81 (1903); FDIC v. Braemoor Assocs., 686
F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983).
13. Hamlyn v. Houston, 1 KB. 81 (1903). This English case was decided
under the predecessor to the ACT, the PARTNERSHIP AcT (1890). 32 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES 635-62 (4th ed. 1987).
14. Hamlyn, 1 K-B. at 84.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 85.
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In a more recent case, FDIC v. Braemoor Associates,8 Judge
Posner cited Hamlyn and applied the same reasoning. The inno-
cent partners were trying to escape liability, claiming illegality of
the acting partner's scheme. 19 The guilty partner constructed
some complicated transactions to borrow money illegally.2" In
protecting the interest of the third party, Judge Posner stated
"[T]he law imposes greater duties on people with regard to the
acts of their agents and partners than with regard to the acts of
strangers, presumably to give people an incentive to choose care-
fully with whom to enter into ventures that may injure innocent
third parties."2' According to the court, if the actor (Braemoor)
was liable, under the principles of partnership, so were the indi-
vidual defendants (partners).22
Perhaps the best expression of this concept appears in a
recent bankruptcy case, Georgou v. Fritzshall.2 s In Georgou, the
innocent partners tried to escape liability because the acting part-
ner was guilty of willful misconduct.24 They claimed the willful
misconduct was not in the ordinary course of the business, and
therefore, they should not be liable.25 The court responded by
stating that no partnership is in the business of willful misconduct
and this type of interpretation would render the ordinary course of
business requirement useless.26 The court reasoned the purpose
of section 13 of the Act is not to protect innocent partners but to
expose the liability of the partnership.
The courts' commitment to protecting third parties has also
been applied to protect limited partners from the actions of gen-
eral partners.2 In Kazanjian v. Rancho Estate, the court rea-
soned that in some respects, limited partners are like creditors of
the partnership. 29 A court might also use this concept to deny a
claim to the partnership as well as protect the rights of the third
18. 686 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1982).
19. Id.
20. FDIC, 686 F.2d at 557.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 555.
23. 145 B.R. 36 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
24. Id. at 37.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Section 13 of the AcT is reprinted in Appendix II. See infra text
accompanying note 37.
28. See Kazanjian v. Rancho Estates, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
29. Id. at 538.
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party. In Zemelman v. Boston Insurance Co.,30 the court denied
an insurance claim in favor of the innocent partners because one
of the partners made false statements on behalf of the partnership
in filing the claim.3 1 The court stated that since the partner's acts
were within the scope of his authority, the partnership was bound
to accept the legal consequences of his actions.32  This left the
partnership with a building destroyed by fire and no insurance
claim.33
The Act has many provisions to protect the interests of third
parties and bring liability upon either the partners, as an aggre-
gate, or the partnership entity.34 Section 9 of the Act binds the
partnership for acts of a partner in apparently carrying on the
partnership business.3 5 A wrongful act or omission of the partner
that brings liability to the partner while acting in the ordinary
course of business will make the partnership liable to the same
extent.3 6 Section 14 protects the interests of a third person when
the partnership or a partner is in charge of the third person's
money or other property.3 7 Partners are held jointly and severally
liable for any liabilities that fall to the partnership under sections
13 and 14.38 Clearly, the drafters of the Act intended to protect
the interests of those dealing with partnerships.
The remainder of this Comment assumes the third party has
a legitimate claim against the partnership and the court will sat-
isfy the claim, regardless of the plaintiff's choice of defendant.
III. WHO BEARS THE ULTIMATE LIABILITY-
ACTING PARTNER OR ENTITY?
A. Historical View (Before the Act)
Often, a court might have to determine who is the responsible
party. For the sake of illustration, Doctor Smith will provide a
30. 84 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
31. Id. at 206. The guilty partner was convicted of five counts of filing a false
and fraudulent claim. Id.
32. Id. at 207.
33. Id. at 206.
34. The ACT is silent on whether the partnership should be considered as an
entity or an aggregate. See discussion infra section III.A.
35. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(1) (1914). This section also provides that
every partner is an agent for the partnership. Id.
36. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 13 (1914).
37. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 14 (1914).
38. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AT § 15(1) (1914).
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running hypothetical throughout this comment. Doctor Smith is
in a general partnership with five other doctors. One Friday after-
noon, Doctor Smith saw a patient who complained of a sprained
ankle. He ordered an X-ray and reported no visible injury. As a
result, the patient was treated for a sprain. One week later, the
patient had complications and visited another doctor. This doctor
told him that he had a small, almost indistinguishable fracture.
This series of events resulted in a potential claim for the patient,
which he is yet to file. The nature of the plaintiff's action will
determine if all parties are before the court or whether one part-
ner will satisfy the judgment and then try to use the court to settle
accounts between the partners. In any event, the question of ulti-
mate liability must be examined first.
A representative of the partnership trying to impose all liabil-
ity on Dr. Smith would find the best arguments in cases decided
before the passage of the Act. Courts historically handled these
cases by distinguishing between the active and the imputed part-
ner.39 The most important factor in determining who was liable
as between partners was simply who was at fault.40 An early New
York case, Kiffer v. Bienstock,4 illustrates this point. Kiffer and
Bienstock were partners.42 Kiffer was involved in an accident
while operating a vehicle owned by the partnership in the course
of partnership business. A judgment was rendered against Kiffer
in the amount of $450.4 3 Upon dissolution of the partnership, Kif-
fer attempted to have the judgment entered as a firm liability. 4
Bienstock was not named as a defendant in the original suit.
45
The court held the judgment was not a partnership liability. The
court stated that "a person operating a vehicle owned by a copart-
nership which may be liable for the acts of such person is not dis-
charged for any wrongful act committed by himself."46 In dictum,
the court further stated that if the partnership had defended the
39. See Kiffer v. Bienstock, 218 N.Y.S. 526 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1926); United
Brokers' Co. v. Dose, 22 P.2d 204 (Or. 1933).
40. See cases cited supra note 39.
41. Kiffer v. Bienstock, 218 N.Y.S. 526 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1926) Actually,
this case was heard more than seven years after the passage of the AcT in New
York (See Appendix I). However, the opinion carries no citation to the AcT and is
apparently decided on common law principles.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 528.
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suit, the partnership would be able to collect from the acting part-
ner upon showing negligence.47 The court made no attempt to
determine any degree of negligence.48 The fact the partner was
acting alone and was negligent placed liability solely on the part-
ner involved in the accident.49
This same principal, that ultimate liability belongs to the
active partner based on the fact that he acted alone, is found in
United Brokers' Co. v. Dose.50 One partner, while operating a
vehicle in the partnership business, settled a claim that arose
from an automobile accident.51 The partner involved in the acci-
dent wanted to charge the partnership with the cost of settling the
suit. 2 Citing many authorities on partnership law,53 the court
rejected his claim stating that a partner has no right to charge the
firm for losses caused from his own negligence.54 An unusual
aspect of this case is the court assumed the negligence, since the
suit was never brought, but merely threatened, by the third
party.55 However, the fact that only one partner was involved was
enough to place the ultimate liability squarely on him.56
47. Id. This scenario is examined infra section III.C.
48. Id. Degree of negligence will be an important consideration under the
analysis pursuant to the ACT. See infra section II.B.
49. As stated supra note 41, this case cited no provisions of the ACT. Instead
the court relies on the authority of Scott v. Curtis, 88 N.E. 794 (N.Y. 1909).
However, the Scott case involved no partners at all. Rather this case was about a
property owner who was held liable when a pedestrian was injured walking in
front of his house. Id. Apparently, some employees of the defendant had left the
cover off of a coal hole, and the plaintiff homeowner was seeking indemnification.
Id. The decision in this case stood for the principle that as between themselves,
an active wrongdoer stands as an indemnitor to the person who has been held
legally liable. Id. The court in Kiffer applied this reasoning to the partnership
situation. Kiffer, 218 N.Y.S. at 527.
50. 22 P.2d 204 (Or. 1933). The ACT was not passed in Oregon until 1939. See
Appendix I.
51. Id. at 205.
52. Id.
53. Id. Among the authorities cited by the court are 2 RowLEY, MODERN LAW
OF PARTNERSHIP § 983 and SHUMAKER, THE LAw OF PARTNERSHIP 160 (2D ED.).
Id.
54. United Brokers' Co., 22 P.2d at 205.
55. Id.
56. Apparently the fact that the partner who settled the suit did so without
the knowledge and consent of his partner, sways the court. Id. This analysis is
similar to the analysis used when the agent acts without authority. However,
one could make the argument under the ACT that one's rights to participate in
the management as an owner, gives a partner the power to make this decision,
339
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A more modern case that followed the same type of reasoning
is Flynn v. Reaves.5 7 A physician tried to bring a third party
action against his partners after being accused of making a negli-
gent diagnosis. 58 The court ruled that a defendant whose negli-
gence is actual cannot seek contribution from his co-partners
whose negligence is only imputed.5 9 The court further stated the
action in such cases belonged to the imputed party against the
active party, after the imputed party had been compelled to sat-
isfy the judgment. 60 According to the Flynn court, the relevant
inquiry is "whose wrong really caused the damage."61
Professor Gilmore's treatise on partnerships echoes the analy-
sis found in the early cases.62  He states, "if the loss or outlay for
which a partner seeks indemnity or contribution was caused only
through his own negligence, . . . no duty to reimburse him
arises."63 Under this active/imputed analysis, Doctor Smith, in
our original hypothetical, would be solely liable for the damages
caused to the patient with the fractured foot, since he was the sole
actor. Following the reasoning of United Brokers' Co., 64 if the doc-
tor decided that settling the suit was better for the partnership
than contesting it, he would still bear the sole liability. Without a
trial, the issue of his negligence is left undetermined; however, he
still could not be indemnified from the partnership under this type
of analysis.65
depending upon other factors. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e) (1914). An
analysis of the scope of authority of partners is outside the scope of this
comment.
57. 218 S.E.2d 661 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975). The reader should note that this case,
although relatively recent, was decided before the passage of the ACT in Georgia.
See Appendix I.
58. Flynn, 218 S.E.2d at 662.
59. Id. at 663.
60. Id. This scenario is examined infra section III.C.
61. Id.
62. EUGENE A. GILMORE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 134
(1911).
63. Id.
64. 22 P.2d 204 (Or. 1933).
65. Some early courts, however, recognized the relationship between partners
called for a different analysis than the active/imputed analysis. See Smith v.
Ayrault, 39 N.W. 724 (Mich. 1888); Snell v. De Land, 27 N.E. 183 (Ill. 1891);
Farney v. Hauser, 198 P. 178 (Kan. 1921).
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B. The Standard Under the Act
Since the drafting of the Act and its adoption in most jurisdic-
tions,66 courts have used a different analysis for cases where one
partner, by act or omission, exposed the firm to liability. 67 The
Act provides the language for different results. 68 Section 18(b)
provides: "The partnership must indemnify every partner in
respect of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably
incurred by him in the ordinary and proper conduct of its busi-
ness, or for the preservation of its business or property."69
By allowing indemnification for ordinary and proper acts rea-
sonably incurred, the liability becomes ultimately the liability of
the partnership. 70 The provision that speaks to how this liability
should be shared is section 18(a) of the Act, which states: "[e]ach
partner... must contribute towards the losses, whether of capital
or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to his share
in the profits."-7 1 According to this section, once the liability is
deemed to be a partnership liability, it is borne by all partners, not
just the acting partner.7 2 The question that a court has to answer
is whether the conduct in question is indemnifiable under the Act.
As established above in Part A, early cases tended to impose
the liability for an act performed in the course of business upon
the acting partner by reasoning that he was acting alone.7 3 Before
the adoption of the Act, a Kansas court in Carlin v. Donegan
stated simply "[a] partner is responsible for losses resulting from
ordinary negligence." 74 In Carlin, the court reversed the lower
court ruling because the jury instruction said the imputed party
was only allowed contribution if the active party had been grossly
66. See Appendix I.
67. See Marcus v. Green, 300 N.E.2d 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); National Oats v.
Volkman, 330 N.E.2d 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); Ferguson v. Williams, 670 S.W.2d
327 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Kraemer v. Gallagher, 235 N.Y.S.2d 874 (N.Y. App. Div.
1962).
68. The ACT is only a default provision. Partners are free to make their own
agreement regarding liabilities, indemnification and contribution. Section 18 of
the AcT begins, "[tihe rights and the duties of the partners in relation to the
partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the
following rules...." UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18 (1914) (emphasis added).
69. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18(b) (1914).
70. Id.
71. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(a) (1914).
72. Id.
73. See discussion supra in section II.A.
74. Carlin v. Donegan, 15 Kan. 495 (1875).
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negligent.7 5  Recent cases decided in jurisdictions which have
adopted the Act have generally drawn a different line to deter-
mine if the liability should belong to the acting individual or the
partnership.7 6 Terms such as "fraud," "culpable negligence," or
"bad faith" have been used.77 Although there is no clear cut defi-
nition for an ordinary and proper act, a comparison of court deci-
sions can help to establish whether liability belongs to the
partnership or the acting partner.
A fraudulent act has been held not to be in the proper course
of partnership business, and thus not eligible for indemnification,
when the acting partner is found liable.78 In Gramercy Equities
Corp. v. Dumont, the trial court found the acting partner commit-
ted intentional fraud by making a promise with no intention of
fulfilling it. The court indemnified the acting partner for half of
the liability he incurred.79 In overruling the indemnification, the
appellate court held that fraud committed against third persons is
not within the proper conduct of a partnership business.8 0 The
policy reason for the holding was that if liability for a fraudulent
act can be shifted there is less incentive to refrain from this type of
conduct. 8 '
On the other side of the transaction, a court has allowed an
imputed partner to be indemnified for satisfying a judgment
caused by another partner's fraudulent act.82 In In re Flick, the
imputed partner was allowed to maintain such an action. 3 The
court held that, "the special relationship of trust as between part-
ners entitles a partner to seek indemnity from a co-partner who
commits a wrong without his knowledge and authorization." 4
Clearly, liability resulting from an act of fraud belongs solely to
the acting partner and not the partnership. 5
75. Id. at 499.
76. See cases cited supra at note 67.
77. See, e.g., Marcus v. Green, 300 N.E.2d 512 (Ill. Ct. App. 1973).
78. See Gramercy Equities Corp. v. Dumont, 531 N.E.2d 629 (N.Y. 1988); In
re Flick, 75 B.R. 204 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987).
79. Gramercy Equities Corp. v. Dumont, 531 N.E.2d 629 (N.Y. 1988).
80. Id. at 633.
81. Id. See also Rosado v. Procter & Schwartz, 484 N.E.2d 1354 (N.Y. 1985).
82. In re Flick, 75 B.R. 204 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987).
83. Id. at 204.
84. Id. at 206.
85. Although this may seem an obvious result, the New York Court of Appeals
had to overturn one trial court and one intermediate appellate court to reach this
342 [Vol. 17:8333
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Generally, courts have denied indemnification under the Act
for the expense of attorney's fees incurred in bringing an action
against a partner guilty of wrongdoing. 6 In Ohlendorf v. Fein-
stein, the court stated that since the plaintiff partner was trying to
protect personal property, the action was not within the Act.8 7
Most cases are of this nature.8 8 The court, however, did allow
indemnification of attorney's fees in Evans v. Boggs8 9 because the
action was to protect partnership property.
Negligent acts are a little harder to fit within the "ordinary
and proper" language. 90 In Kraemer v. Gallagher, 91 the court did
not allow a counterclaim by the defendant, who wanted to be reim-
bursed for money he had put into the partnership.9 2 He claimed
that his partner, the plaintiff, had failed to engage an attorney for
a real estate closing which resulted in liability for the firm.93 The
court reasoned that since the defendant was aware the plaintiff
had been handling similar transactions for years, and it was a risk
inherent in this practice, it was appropriately a partnership liabil-
ity.94 Another reason stated by the court was the defendant
shared the profits from sales; therefore, he should also share the
liabilities.9" In the hypothetical, Doctor Smith can argue that one
occasionally will misread an X-Ray and that this is a risk inherent
in the business of a doctor, providing there is no other breach of
fiduciary duty.
Another illustrative case is Marcus v. Green. 96 This case
involved a third party claim made by a co-defendant, Schroeder,
against his partner, Green.97 A ten thousand dollar loss was suf-
conclusion. See Gramercy Equities Corp. v. Dumont, 531 N.E.2d 629 (N.Y.
1988).
86. See Ohlendorf v. Feinstein, 697 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Li v.
Tang, 535 P.2d 819 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975); Kunz v. Huddleston, 546 S.W.2d 685
(Tex. Ct. App. 1977); Fiorito v. Goerig, 179 P.2d 316 (Wash. 1947); but see Evans
v. Boggs, 245 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).
87. Ohlendorf, 697 S.W.2d at 556.
88. See supra note 86.
89. 245 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1951).
90. Under the active/imputed partner analysis, any sole act was not
indemnifiable, therefore the courts had no problem with the negligence question.
91. 235 N.Y.S.2d 874 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962).
92. Id. at 874.
93. Id. at 875.
94. Id. at 876.
95. Id.
96. 300 N.E.2d 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
97. Id. at 513.
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fered by the partnership after an employee was hurt when the
scaffolding on which he was working collapsed. 98 The trial jury
found, in a special interrogatory, that Schroeder was not in charge
of any activities at the construction site.99 Schroeder made the
argument that liability suffered by the imputed partner is indem-
nifiable by the active partner. 10 This indemnification claim was
successful at the trial level. 101 While not disturbing the fact find-
ing of the trial court, the appellate court held that absent fraud,
culpable negligence, or bad faith, liability would not be shifted for
losses which are inherent in the partnership business.0 2 The
court also stated the injury which occurred could be reasonably
anticipated in the construction business.1 0 3 The term culpable
negligence might be problematic, but must be read in light of the
findings of the court.' The partnership was held liable for activi-
ties that were basically under the control of one partner; however,
the partner's actions did not reach the level that warranted
indemnification to the imputed partner. 10 5 It is logical to con-
clude that the degree of negligence required to trigger liability to
co-partners, either as an aggregate or an entity, is greater than
that necessary to trigger partnership liability to third parties.
In a 1984 Texas case, Ferguson v. Williams, 10 6 the court held
as a matter of law that "negligence in the management of the
affairs of a general partnership or joint venture does not create
any right of action against that partner by other members of the
98. Id.
99. Id. at 515. Defendant Green was the owner of the construction company
The appellate court found the partnership itself was the "person" in charge of the
construction site. Id.
100. Id. at 514. This is the same analysis that was used before the passage of
the ACT.
101. Id. at 514.
102. Id. at 520. The court cited Snell v. De Land, 27 N.E. 183 (Ill. 1891), which
held the partner should be indemnified unless he showed a "willful disregard of
duty." Id. at 184.
103. Marcus, 300 N.E.2d at 520.
104. Culpable negligence is defined differently in different jurisdictions. In
some jurisdictions, it is similar to ordinary negligence, but in other jurisdictions,
it means something greater than ordinary negligence. BALLENTINE'S LAW
DICTIONARY 296 (3d ed. 1969). These jurisdictions define culpable negligence as
implying conscious disregard. Id. Since culpable negligence does not signify a
specific meaning within itself, it should be read in light of the decision.
105. Marcus, 300 N.E.2d at 520.
106. 670 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
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partnership.'l 0 7 The court further stated it would take a breach of
trust to sustain an action.' The court made this ruling despite
finding the negligence of two partners was the proximate cause of
the loss suffered by the other partner.10 9
The foregoing cases, and the analysis used by the courts,
tends to support the proposition that a liability incurred by an act
of ordinary negligence of single partner will be a partnership lia-
bility if the act involves a risk inherent in the partnership busi-
ness. Apparently, the act of a partner must reach the level of
recklessness or involve some culpable mental state before the lia-
bility is solely his and not the partnership's.
An examination of the plain meaning of the words of the stat-
ute lends support to the proposition that more than ordinary neg-
ligence is needed to hold the acting partner solely liable. The
words of the statute are "ordinary and proper conduct of its busi-
ness."110 Since the term ordinary is not troublesome, the thresh-
old question becomes, "What actions are proper?" Perhaps the
better question to ask is, "What actions are not improper?" These
actions would require indemnity from the partnership. 111 When
seeking indemnification for a liability incurred, a partner must
prove that his activity was "in the ordinary and proper course of
the business."112 According to Black's Law Dictionary, "proper" is
defined as "fit, suitable, appropriate . . .and [r]easonably suffi-
cient."11 3 Thus, if the action that causes the liability fits this crite-
ria of reasonable sufficiency, it should be indemnifiable by the
partnership. Doctor Smith was probably negligent by a legal stan-
dard. 114 But was his negligence improper under Section 18(b)? ' 5
Black's Law Dictionary states that negligence is chiefly character-
ized by "inadvertence."1 According to the American Heritage
Dictionary, an inadvertent act is "accidental" and/or "uninten-
107. Id. at 331.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(b) (1914).
111. Id.
112. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(b) (1914).
113. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990).
114. According to BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY, negligence carries many different
definitions. BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990). The common
denominator in all expressions of negligence is want of reasonable care and the
duty to exercise such care in conduct which may result in injuries to others. Id.
115. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(b) (1914).
116. BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990).
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tional." 1 7 One can be acting suitably, appropriately, and reason-
ably sufficient and still make a mistake. Therefore, an act that is
unintentional should still be considered proper under the Act and
indemnifiable. If Doctor Smith's unintentional act had resulted in
a windfall, 118 the other partners would certainly claim their
respective shares of that profit." 9 A mistaken act is not improper
under section 18(b) of the Act. Liability incurred for this type of
negligence should be indemnified.
Other levels of negligence, however, might be improper and
not capable of indemnity. For example, a distinction is drawn
between ordinary negligence and gross negligence. Gross negli-
gence is defined as "[t]he intentional failure to perform a manifest
duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life
or property of another." 2 ° An act of reckless disregard would not
be proper or reasonably suitable. If Doctor Smith failed to take an
X-ray, or decided not to read it, it would seem to be an act of reck-
less disregard under this definition. This would not be proper, as
the other partners would expect Doctor Smith to act with
regard.' 2 ' Therefore, once his conduct reaches the level of reck-
lessness or gross negligence, then the conduct would not be
proper. This means he should not be indemnified and must bear
sole liability for this act. Likewise, if the suit is brought against
the partnership, he should indemnify the partnership for the
loss.1 22  The plain definition of the words "ordinary and proper"
seems to support the idea that a partner cannot shift the liability
for his acts once they reach the level of recklessness.
23
One may look to the Restatement of Restitution for further
support for requiring a mental state of at least recklessness for
117. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 663 (4th ed. 1973).
118. For the sake of argument, suppose Doctor Smith unintentionally or
mistakenly took an X-ray of the wrong body part, but found another problem
which resulted in more visits and thus fees, from the patient. Wouldn't the
partners argue they were entitled to a share of these profits?
119. This result would parallel the reasoning in Ferguson v. Williams, 670
S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
120. BLAces LAw DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990).
121. "Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its
business...." UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9 (1914). An agent is a fiduciary for
the principal. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1957). These principles
suggest that a partner has a right to expect that his co-partner is acting
competently, not recklessly or carelessly. Id.
122. See discussion infra section III.
123. See supra notes 110-19.
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holding the actor ultimately liable.1 24 Section 96 provides that
one who has become subject to tort liability for the unauthorized
and wrongful conduct of another is entitled to indemnity. 125 Com-
ment B further explains by stating that if the actor was not guilty
of seriously wrongful conduct while acting in accordance with
another's direction, the principal should indemnify the agent. 126
Stated differently, unless the wrong is a serious wrong, the ulti-
mate liability belongs to the principal.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency contains a similar provi-
sion stating that a principal has a duty to indemnify an agent for
payments made to a third party resulting from liability for an
authorized activity that constitutes a tort. 127 The comments
provide:
If, however, the agent, at the direction of the principal, commits
an act which constitutes a tort but which the agent believes not to
be tortious, he is entitled to indemnity to the amount which he is
required to pay as damages. This is true both where the principal
contemplates the likelihood that the directed act will constitute a
tort and where he has no reason to anticipate that it will be
tortious. 128
The partnership has no reason to anticipate tort liability from a
mistaken or unintentional act as long as there is no breach of the
fiduciary duty.
Further evidence that ordinary negligence is a partnership
liability is the recent popularity of the limited liability company
and the limited liability partnership. If personal assets of part-
ners were not exposed to liability, there would be no need for these
new entities. Most of these new statutes exist to protect one part-
ner's personal assets from liability for acts of another partner.
129
124. One may wonder why principles of restitution are applicable to
partnership cases. The AcT contains a provision that supports the use of this
authority. Section 4(1) provides: "The rule that statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed shall have no application to this act."
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 4(1) (1914). Indemnity and contribution were first
developed in equity for the purpose of correcting unjust enrichment, and thus are
appropriate rules for examining partnership issues. GEORGE E. PALMER, THE
LAw OF RESTITUTION § 1.5(D) (1978).
125. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96 (1936).
126. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96 cmt. b (1936).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 439 (1957).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 439 cmt. g (1957).
129. An example of the statute used for this type of organization is:
A partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not individually
liable for debts and obligations of the partnership arising from errors,
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The use of the word "negligence" in the limited liability statutes
shows that legislatures feel the Act may not protect one partner
from the negligent acts of another.'30
There is a parallel to the apparent recklessness standard in
the business context. The "business judgment rule" exists in some
form in all jurisdictions. 13 1 Generally, this rule protects directors,
officers and other corporate personnel when suit is brought
against them.'3  As long as they are acting in good faith with the
reasonable belief that their conduct is in the best interests of the
corporation, they can be indemnified for litigation expenses.'1
3
Professor Beveridge suggests the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act should include a provision codifying the business judgment
rule in the partnership context.134 He also suggests that a duty of
care provision be included. 13 5
A recklessness standard is the correct standard in determin-
ing whether a liability should be charged to the acting partner or
the partnership. 136 Everyday mistakes and unintentional acts
that might occur are part of the risks inherent in becoming a part-
omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance committed in the
course of the partnership business by another partner or representative
of the partnership not working under the supervision or direction of the
first partner at the time the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence,
or malfeasance occurred, unless the first partner was directly involved
in the specific activity in which the errors, omissions, negligence,
incompetence, or malfeasance were committed by the other partner or
representative.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45(b) (1993) (emphasis added).
130. The word negligence appears in virtually all of these statutes. See
Appendix I for more states that have included some of this language in their
version of the AcT.
131. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 380 (3rd ed. 1983).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Norwood Beveridge, Jr., Duty of Care: The Partnership Cases, 15 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 753 (1990).
135. Id.
136. Even some of the cases decided before the passage of the ACT indicated the
partner bearing the liability was guilty of something more than ordinary
negligence. See generally Thomas v. Atherton, 10 Ch. D. 185 (1878) ("acted with
gross negligence and recklessness"); Yorks v. Tozier, 60 N.W. 846 (Minn. 1894)
("he was, to say the least, grossly negligent"); contra Carlin v. Donegan, 15 Kan.
495 (1875) ("and a partner is responsible for losses resulting from ordinary
negligence").
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ner. In fact, the more one attempts to maximize profits,13 7 the
more likely it becomes that one will make a mistake that would
expose the firm to liability. It seems only just for the firm that
shares increased profits to also share the liabilities. 3 " Doctor
Smith might only see one patient a day. This would arguably
increase his chances of avoiding liability for himself or the part-
nership; however, this would be unacceptable to his partners.
Also, partnership is a voluntary act. The law will not force anyone
into a partnership. 39 If a partner believes that he is in danger of
imputed liability, he can dissolve the partnership immediately by
leaving.140 It is not equitable to accept the profits made by a part-
ner only to sever the relationship when liabilities arise. Modern
courts have appropriately recognized this and applied at least a
recklessness14 1 standard under the Act.
IV. How TO USE THE TOOLS OF INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION
TO SETTLE AcCOUNTs BETWEEN PARTNERS
Often a court must adjust accounts between partners. The
entity theory of partnership, contribution, and indemnification are
helpful tools in this process.
A. The Entity Theory
Whether a partnership should be considered a separate legal
entity or an aggregate of the partners has been historically dis-
137. "A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit." UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6. If the business is
not to make a profit, it is not a partnership by definition, and the AcT does not
apply.
138. The reader is reminded that this assumes no prior agreement and the
partners are relying on the AcT as the default provision. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
AcT § 18 (1914).
139. Section § 31 of the ACT provides that unless the partnership is formed for
a definite period of time or for a specific purpose, it may be dissolved at will by
any of the partners. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31 (1914). Even if there is an
agreement for a specified time or a purpose, one may leave the partnership and
only be responsible for the damages caused by the breach, not by any future
activities of the remaining partners, since they essentially become a new entity.
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 29 (1914).
140. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 29 (1914).
141. The concept of "inherent risk" is also used by modem courts. See, e.g.,
Marcus v. Green, 300 N.E.2d 512, 520 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Kraemer v. Gallagher,
235 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962).
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puted. 142 The original author of the Act, Dean Ames, would have
defined a partnership as a legal person. 143 Unfortunately, he died
before completion of the Act and his successor, Dean Lewis, did
not support the entity view.144 Consequently, the Act itself is
silent on the question. 145 Since the drafting of the Act, however,
courts have used the entity and/or the aggregate theory whenever
necessary.146  The trend is toward the entity theory. 47 The
Revised Uniform Partnership Act clearly states the partnership
will be considered an entity. 48
Settling liabilities is a perfect time to utilize the entity theory.
This will achieve two goals. First, use of the entity theory will
create ease in the property transactions used to make adjustments
between partners and the partnership. 49 Smith v. Hensley'5 °
presents an interesting scenario in this respect. The plaintiff sued
the partnership for damage to a truck caused by negligence of the
employees of the partnership.' 5 ' Since the plaintiff was a one-
eighth owner of the business, he was in effect suing himself. 52
Also, since the negligence of the employees was imputed to the
partnership, as part owner the plaintiff might be barred from
recovery. ' 53 The court used separate entity reasoning to allow the
142. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP 1:21 (1988).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145, Id. Although the ACT itself is silent, Bromberg and Ribstein suggest that
the ACT has many entity provisions, most of which have to deal with the right of
the partnership to possess property. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 142, at
1:23.
146. Id. at 1:40.
147. Many states now allow partnerships to sue and be sued at law. BROMBERG
& RiasTEmN, supra note 142, at 1:26. For an example of such a statute, see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-69.1 (1983).
148. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201 (1992), reprinted in ALAN R. BROMBERG
& LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, SPECIAL RELEASE ON THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT 13 (1993).
149. See Walker v. Walker, 854 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Neb. 1994), for a good
example of how a court keeps personal property and partnership property
separate to reach a consistent result in a complicated situation.
150. 354 S.W.2d 744 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961).
151. Id. at 745.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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action anyway.15 4 Also, some courts will exhaust partnership
property first before reaching individual property.
155
Second, the tools of indemnity and contribution as referred to
in the Act 15 6 are drafted in terms of indemnity from the partner-
ship and contribution to the partnership, not the individual part-
ners. For the remainder of this Comment, the term "partnership"
will be used to represent the entity.'
57
B. Indemnity and Contribution
Indemnity is defined simply as "reimbursement."158 Contri-
bution is defined as the "right of one who has discharged a com-
mon liability to recover of another also liable, the aliquot portion
which he ought to pay or bear." 59 Both remedies were developed
in the equity courts, primarily in surety cases, to prevent unjust
enrichment. 6 0 This is appropriate to the hypothetical situation.
154. Id.
155. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 142, at 1:03; Schuler v. Birnbaum,
405 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
156. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(a)(b) (1914). For the information of the
reader, the REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT changes little of the wording
found in these two sections. The REVISED ACT states:
Section 401. Partner's Rights and Duties
(b) A partnership shall credit each partner's account with an equal
share of the partnership profits. A partnership shall charge each
partner with a share of the partnership losses, whether capital or
operating, in proportion to the partner's share of the profits.
(c) A partnership shall indemnify each partner for payments reasonably
made and liabilities reasonably incurred by the partner in the ordinary
and proper conduct of the business of the partnership or for the
preservation of its business or property.
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 401 (1992), Reprinted in ALAN R. BROMBERG &
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, SPECIAL RELEASE ON THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
AcT, 46 (1993).
157. In some of the cases, an entity theory is not practical. For example, in the
case of the dissolved partnership, there is no partnership property and an action
for indemnity becomes basically one for contribution from the copartners. See,
e.g., Marcus v. Green, 300 N.E.2d 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). When looking at these
types of cases, however, one should always go through the process, primarily to
expose any existing partnership property before reaching personal assets of the
copartners. BROMBERG & RmsTEIN, supra note 142, at 1:03.
158. BLAcis LAw DICTIoNARY 769 (6th ed. 1990).
159. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 328 (6th ed. 1990).
160. GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAw OF RESTrUTION 29 (1978). Professor Palmer
states that when courts fail to realize that indemnity and contribution were
established to prevent unjust enrichment, they tend to reach undesirable results.
Id. at 30.
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In the hypothetical, Doctor Smith's partners would be unjustly
enriched if they were allowed to share in his profits, but not
required to contribute to what should be a partnership liability.
On the other hand, if Doctor Smith had failed, due to recklessness,
to take an X-ray, he would be unjustly enriched if the plaintiff
chose to sue the partnership, and the partnership had no action
against him. The courts can use these remedies to produce desira-
ble results, regardless of the plaintiff's choice of defendant.
Two basic, but crucial, rules apply to all indemnification and
contribution actions. Courts insist that a plaintiff prove that he
actually incurred the expense to maintain an action. 161 Secondly,
the action is based on the amount paid, not the possible liability
(assuming a difference between the two). 162
Historically, partners defending in contribution actions tried
to avoid liability by claiming courts did not allow actions between
joint tortfeasors.16 3 In Farney v. Hauser, 164 the court explained,
[T]he reason why ordinary tort-feasors are refused judicial aid to
enforce contribution between them is because the state does not
establish and maintain courts to adjudicate between rogues or ras-
cals who have willfully placed themselves beyond the pale of the
law, nor to conduct inquiries as to their relative guilt. 1 65
The court then stated this did not apply to partnership cases since
they were joint tortfeasors at law, not actually willfully culpa-
ble. 166 Today many states have passed the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act to handle the problems of joint
tortfeasors; 167 however, it does not apply to the partnership set-
ting by its own terms. Section 1(f) says "[tihis Act does not impair
any right of indemnity under existing law."'6 8 Section 1(g) states
161. See generally Colligan v. Caprio, 252 N.Y.S.2d 571 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1964)
(no record that the plaintiff had been sued); Burstein v. Zelman, 5 Cal. Rptr. 829
(Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (plaintiff had paid nothing toward the liquidation of the
partnership); Jones v. Shoji, 336 N.C. 581, 444 S.E.2d 203 (1994) (no personal
expense, therefore no indemnification).
162. See, e.g., Goldring v. Chudacoff, 60 P.2d 135 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
163. See In re Ryan's Estate, 147 N.W. 993 (Wis. 1914); Farney v. Hauser, 198
P. 178 (Kan. 1921).
164. 198 P. 178 (Kan. 1921).
165. Id. at 180.
166. Id. Apparently, this is well settled at this point, but for another view see
Flynn v. Reaves, 218 S.E.2d 661 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
167. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFAsoRs AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 64
(1955).
168. UNIFORM CONTRMIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 1(f), 12 U.L.A. 64
(1955).
352 [Vol. 17:333
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss2/4
1995] PARTNERSHIP INDEMNIFICATION & CONTRIBUTION
"[tihis Act shall not apply to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary
obligation."16 9 Since the basis of partnership is agency and fiduci-
ary duty,170 the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
does not apply to partnership problems.
C. Solving the Different Possibilities
When a plaintiff has a claim from the actions of one partner,
the plaintiff may sue either the partner, the partnership,' 7 ' or
another partner. 172 Depending on the facts of the situation, either
the acting partner or the partnership should bear the ultimate lia-
bility for the loss.173 This leaves the court with a possibility of six
different combinations in which these types of cases can arise. 174
Two of these scenarios can be disposed of easily. When the
plaintiff sues the party that is ultimately liable for the act, the
court should not allow any present or subsequent actions for
indemnity or contribution. If the acting partner has acted in a
reckless or grossly negligent manner, a later action for indemnifi-
cation or contribution should be denied. This is the action in Gra-
mercy Equities Corp. v. Dumont. 7 5 Since the party defending the
claim was found to have acted fraudulently, he was denied an
169. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 1(g), 12 U.L.A. 64
(1955).
170. "The law of agency shall apply under this act." UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT
§ 4(3) (1914).
171. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 13 (1914).
172. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 15(a) (1914). Although joint and several
liability of all the partners is allowed by the AcT, a different result was reached
in Keech v. Mead Johnson & Co., 580 A.2d 1374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). In this
medical malpractice case, the plaintiffs brought suit against the active physician,
the imputed physician, and the partnership entity. Id. at 1375. The court
dismissed the claim of the plaintiff against the imputed partner in her individual
capacity, saying she was still liable as a partner. Id. at 1379. The court
analogizes the difference between the individual and the partnership with the
difference between the stockholder and the corporation. Id. However, a major
difference is that the stockholder has no rights in the management of the
corporation except electing directors, whereas the individual has management
rights in the partnership. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 18(e) (1914).
173. See discussion supra section II.
174. These cases can be resolved in one of two ways - either in an accounting
action or a separate action for contribution or indemnification. The six different
combinations in which these cases can occur has been reduced to a chart found in
Table I. This chart represents the different situations in grid form to hopefully
make the comparisons of the different situations easier.
175. 531 N.E.2d 629 (N.Y. 1988).
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action for indemnification.'7 6 Likewise, if the loss should ulti-
mately fall to the partnership and the partnership is a party to the
suit, the result will be just. This is the case in Marcus v. Green. 177
The partnership was before the court, and since the act involved
no bad faith, culpable negligence or fraud, no indemnity to the
imputed party was allowed.' 78
If the liability is ultimately the responsibility of the partner-
ship, but the partner who acted is sued and pays a judgment, then
the partnership should indemnify the partner according to section
18(b) of the Act.' 79  In North River Insurance Co. v. Spain Oil
Co. ,180 the court allowed a partner, who had paid a judgment for
injuries caused to an employee, to maintain an action for contribu-
tion against his other two partners.18 1 Citing section 18(b) of the
Act, the court stated the very nature of a partnership is an under-
taking to share in profits or losses.18 2 Thus, an action for contri-
bution was allowed, even though the court reported there was
some evidence the partner who paid the judgment was personally
at fault for the injuries to the employee.18 3 The action, according
to the court, arose from the relationship between the parties as
partners.'8 4 Another example of this type of action is found in an
early Michigan decision, Smith v. Ayrault. a5 The plaintiffs,
Smiths, paid a judgment for a patent violation in the selling of
pipe. '8 6 They then sought contribution of one half of the judgment
176. Id. at 633.
177. 300 N.E.2d 512 (I1. App. Ct. 1973).
178. Id. at 520.
179. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18(b) (1914). Reimbursement should come
from the partnership (entity) property first. Id. This protects the individual
property of the partners to the extent the entity can discharge the obligation. Id.
If the entity does not have sufficient resources to indemnify the partner, then
each partner should contribute in the proportion of profits. UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18(a) (1914).
180. 515 N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
181. Id. Actually, this suit was brought by the partner's insurer, but the same
basic rights applied to the subrogee. Id. at 704.
182. Id. at 706.
183. Id.
184. Id. This action occurred after the dissolution of the entity. Since there
was no entity property to use for indemnification, contribution was an
appropriate remedy. See infra note 188.
185. 39 N.W. 724 (Mich. 1888). This case was before the drafting of the
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT and is apparently decided on principles of retribution
and unjust enrichment.
186. Id. at 725.
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from the defendant, Ayrault, who was one half owner of the part-
nership.18 7 Even though the defendant was not named in the orig-
inal suit,' the court held that since the Smiths had made the
sales in good faith, it would be inequitable if the defendant did not
share in the losses in proportion to his profits.'8 9 Thus, contribu-
tion was allowed. 190
Another situation that can arise is when the third party sues
the partnership, and the acting partner has been at least grossly
negligent or reckless and should bear the cost. Eichberger v.
Reid, 19' is based on this scenario. One partner caused the part-
nership to suffer liability because of a misrepresentation in the
sale of property. 192 The trial court ruled the imputed partner had
an action for indemnity against the acting partner because the
fiduciary duty was breached.193 The court relied on equitable
principles to reach this conclusion.' The Restatement of Resti-
tution speaks to this type of indemnity in section 96, which states:
"[a] person who, without personal fault, has become subject to tort
liability for the unauthorized and wrongful conduct of another, is
entitled to indemnity from the other for expenditures properly
made in the discharge of such liability."'95 In a partnership, the
entity would be the person indemnified.' 9 ' Also, Restatement
(Second) of Agency section 401 states: "[a]n agent is subject to lia-
bility for loss caused to the principal by any breach of duty."9 7 As
stated before, each partner is an agent of the partnership. 198 It is
appropriate for a partnership held liable to obtain indemnity in
situations where the ultimate liability should fall upon the acting
partner.
187. Id.
188. The original plaintiffs were the brother-in-law and the nephew of Ayrault.
Id.
189. Id. at 731.
190. Id. Apparently, the court uses an aggregate theory of partnership in
ordering contribution rather than indemnification. This was necessary since the
partnership was dissolved at the time of the suit. Since no partnership property
was discussed in the report, we can assume none existed; therefore, contribution
was the proper remedy.
191. 728 S.W.2d 533 (Ky. 1987).
192. Id. at 534.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 535.
195. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96 (1936).
196. See discussion supra section III.A.
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401 (1957).
198. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(1) (1914).
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The last type of scenario is when the third party has chosen
one partner who is liable for the acts of another partner by opera-
tion of the Act. 199 If the liability is a partnership liability, the
imputed partner should be indemnified by the partnership accord-
ing to section 18(b) of the Act.20 0 This is the situation in In re
Flick.2 °1 The plaintiff in this case was the imputed partner.2 °2
The court stated that the relationship of trust between partners
entitles one to seek indemnity from a wrongdoing co-partner.2 °3
The Restatement (Second) of Agency also calls for indemnification
in this situation.2° ' It states the principal should indemnify the
agents in payments resulting in benefit to the principal, made
under such circumstances that it would not be equitable to refuse
indemnity. 2 5 This is such a situation. If the imputed party pays
a judgment that should be the ultimate liability of the acting part-
ner, the imputed party should be indemnified from the principal
(entity) and the entity should then seek indemnification from the
active party, in accordance with the principles in the preceding
paragraph.2 °6
V. CONCLUSION
When one partner acting within the partnership business
does not act with, at the least, any reckless, or gross negligence,
the partnership should bear the ultimate liability. After deter-
mining who should bear the ultimate liability, the court can use
the tools of indemnity and contribution to fix the liability on the
199. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15(a) (1914).
200. See infra Appendix II.
201. 75 B.R. 204 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987).
202. Id. at 205.
203. Id. at 206.
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 439(c) (1957).
205. Id.
206. The reader might be wondering why the transaction should proceed
through the entity to the active partner. Why not just require the active partner
to indemnify the imputed partner? If the partnership and the active partner
have plenty of property to satisfy the judgment, this is exactly what will happen
anyway. Also, if there is no entity property, then the entity transaction will not
be necessary. However, the line of reasoning should be followed to account for
situations when the active party is judgment proof and the entity has property.
This will best protect the rights of the imputed party. See, e.g., Schuler v.
Birnbaum, 405 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
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appropriate party. This is in accordance with the Act, and the
general principles of agency and restitution.
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TABLE I
Active Partner
Ultimately Liable
Partnership
Ultimately Liable
Partnership held
responsible to third
party
Active party held
responsible to third
party
Imputed party held
responsible to third
party
Partnership (entity) is
indemnified by the
active partner
EXAMPLE:
Eichburger v. Reid,
728 S.W.2d 533 (Ky.
1937).
No action needed
between partners.
EXAMPLE: Gramercy
Equities Corp. v.
Dumont, 531 N.E.2d
629 (N.Y. 1988).
Imputed partner
indemnified by
partnership (entity)
then partnership is
indemnified by the
active partner
EXAMPLE: In re
Flick, 75 B.R. 204
(Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1987).
All partners
contribute equally to
the loss
EXAMPLE: Marcus v.
Green, 300 N.E.2d
512 (Ill. App. Ct.
1973).
Active partner
indemnified by the
partnership (entity)
and all partners
contribute to the loss
EXAMPLE: North
River Ins. Co. v.
Spain Oil Co., 515
N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1987).
Imputed partner
indemnified by the
partnership (entity)
and all partners
contribute to the loss
EXAMPLE: In re
Flick, 75 B.R. 204
(Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1987).
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APPENDIX I
Jurisdictions That Have Adopted the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
and the Effective Date (this Chart is adopted from various appen-
dices in REUSCHLIN & GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP (4th
ed. 1989))
Alabama 1972 Montana 1947
Alaska 1917 Nebraska 1943
Arizona 1954 Nevada 1931
Arkansas 1941 New Hampshire 1973
California 1949 New Jersey 1919
Colorado 1931* New Mexico 1947
Connecticut 1961 New York 1919*
Delaware 1947 North Carolina 1941
District of Columbia 1962 North Dakota 1959
Florida 1973 Ohio 1949*
Georgia 1985 Oklahoma 1955
Guam # Oregon 1939
Hawaii 1973 Pennsylvania 1915
Idaho 1920 Rhode Island 1957
Illinois 1917* South Carolina 1950*
Indiana 1950 South Dakota 1923
Iowa 1971* Tennessee 1917
Kansas 1972* Texas 1962
Kentucky 1954* Utah 1921
Maine 1973 Vermont 1941
Maryland 1916 Virgin Islands 1957
Massachusetts 1923 Virginia 1918*
Michigan 1917 Washington 1955
Minnesota 1921* West Virginia 1953
Mississippi 1977 Wisconsin 1915+
Missouri 1949 Wyoming 1977
Note: All states are listed except Louisiana.
* Denotes states that have changed the wording of their Act to accommodate
language distinguishing a limited liability partnership.
+ Wisconsin has changed the language of its statute to gender neutral terms.
# Date unavailable.
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APPENDIX II
Selected Provisions of the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 4 (1) The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to
be strictly construed shall have no application to this act.
(3) The law of agency shall apply under this act.
§ 5 In any case not provided for in this act the rules of law and equity,
including the law merchant, shall govern.
§ 6 (1) A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry
on as co-owners a business for profit.
§ 9 (1) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of
its business, and the act of every partner, including the execution
in the partnership name of any instrument, for apparently
carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership of
which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so
acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in the
particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has
knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.
§ 13 Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in
the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the
authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is caused to any person,
not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred,
the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner
so acting or omitting to act.
§ 15 All partners are liable: (a) jointly and severally for everything
chargeable to the partnership under sections 13 and 14. (b) Jointly
for all other debts and obligations of the partnership; ....
§ 18 (a) Each partner... must contribute towards the losses, whether
of capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to
his share in the profits.
(b) The partnership must indemnify every partner in respect of
payments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by
him in the ordinary and proper conduct of its business, or for the
preservation of its business or property.
§ 31 Dissolution is caused: (1) Without violation of the agreement
between partners,... (b) by the express will of any partner when
no definite term or particular undertaking is specified ....
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